Argument Theory--Thomas Goodnight

I am starting to see these different theories as merging into each other to create options for the arguer/audience/evaluator/social constructivist, etc. I was particularly interested with Thomas Goodnight’s distinction of spheres: personal, technical, and public. This very clearly, to me, relates to rhetorical argumentation in that we will construct arguments based on the situation (the rhetorical situation perhapsHow has the changing spheres (broadening or constricting) problematized argumentation? I am very interested in social argumentation especially where questions of class, race, gender (basically “otherness”) comes into play. I believe that identifying audience is more problematic than it has been before. For instance, one hundred years ago, political speeches were made to very distinct audience—whoever could be gathered at a specific place in time. However, with radio and television, spaces for debate and argument increased, thus creating a more (to use Perelman—who I love by the way) universal audience. Now, if we discuss the use of youtube, web sites, camera phones, etc, debates, speeches, etc can be analyzed by an audience and space and time constrictions are somewhat less a factor (there are of course access issues, etc). Speeches/arguments made behind closed doors to a specific audience can be easily recorded and transmitted to “public” spaces, thus creating an even larger universal audience. How does this affect argumentation both in terms of construction and evaluation?
Any ideas? (for anyone)

Argumentation Theory: Perelman

I found the discussion on ethics and morals in relation to Perelman’s new rhetoric interesting in that critics find the intentional shaping of argument to convince/persuade an audience is a lesser form of argument than the “logic” based argumentation. Van Eemeren et. al. emphasize that “All arguers must decide for themselves how far they can and will go in adapting to the audience. The problem of the ethics to be employed in this regard, say Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, cannot be solved by argumentation theory”(99). In many ways, I see this being more a question of the speaker/writer/arguers ethos. This calls for more of a need for the audience’s ability to critically analyze arguments (and this goes to education). Another interesting point made in VE is in discussing Platonist perspective in relation to this idea of new rhetoric: “A reminder is appropriate here of the Platonist criticism of rhetoric that striving after approval of people, and the equation of approval with soundness are barriers in the way of the search for truth. Far from being connected with any form of cynicism, however, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s relativism spring from their firm belief…in democracy and philosophical pluralism. They most certainly care about ethics and moral standards” (120). I am interpreting the division in ideas here to be twofold: first, if “truth” is the goal, then only logic is appropriate regardless of audience make-up or motivations, and if the audience’s approval is being sought and the arguer’s goal is to frame the argument taking into account the values and motivations of the audience, then there is room for trickery and manipulation. This again goes back to my ideas above that this falls more in the realm of ethos. I would love to hear your thoughts on this.

I also wanted to look at the criticisms of the new rhetoric mentioned in VE.

First, I didn’t see many questionable concepts in Perelman in regards to argumentative structure and the use of nonanalytic arguments. (However, I do feel like I’ll need to take a look at Perelman’s New Rhetoric to get a fully grasp this theory). Rather, I understood these concepts using Rowland as a lens and looking at defining or describing such arguments as necessary in evaluating them. Criticisms seemed to focus on two things: the variance in audiences making it difficult to test new rhetoric argument schemes, and when using their “tyopology in analyzing argumentation it is rarely possible for all interpreters to arrive at the same unequivolcal interpretation” (123). I find the determinism to “measure” the effects ironic considering Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s emphasis on nonanalytic argumentation (although I understand the human need for placing empirical value on such concepts). Nevertheless, I think taking Brockreide’s emphasis of “arguments are not in statements but in people” assumption about argument to show how looking for exactness in the interpretation of argument analysis subjective based on the evaluator and/or audience will be quite difficult. I am sure once I read and evaluate more arguments/analysis of Perelman’s theory, these ideas will make more sense to me (I hope).

Argument Theory: Brockreide, O'Keefe, Rowland, and Tindale

For this post, I am focusing on the RA readings, mostly because I need to grasp the various concepts of how to and not to define argument by more closely looking at the theories next to each other. Rowland suggests that the difficulty of defining argument lies in the polarity of previous attempts to define rhetoric, where some theories look strictly at the argument made in formal argument rather than informal, real life argumentation. O’Keefe and Rowland both begin looking a “argument” by critically analyzing Brockriede’s six characteristics of argument. All authors seem to contend with Brockreide’s first element of argument which is “an inferential leap from existing beliefs to the adoption of a new belief or to the reinforcement of an old one” (10). This, to me, is the end of general consensus between the four authors.

One theme that is approached is looking at whether argument needs to be productive in nature. Brockreide’s second characteristic that argument needs a perceived rationale to support [the inferential] leap” (10) is also reflected in Rowland’s definition of argument [“argumentation is discourse in which people attempt to solve problems rationally by supporting their claim with reason and evidence(83]). O’Keefe and Tindale both break from such theory. O’Keefe states that the focus on the “making of argumentation” overshadows “having the argument” in his characterization of argument. My understanding of O’Keefe’s definition of “having an argument” is informal and unproductive; however, O’Keefe contends that “having an argument” still deserves the attention of argument theory. O’Keefe explains that even a poorly made argument is still an argument and thus informal argumentation also can be analyzed using this second characteristic. Even Tindale discusses Johnson’s assertion that a poorly made argument that is not accepted by an audience cannot be classified as an argument. Thus, he is suggesting that only reasonable and accepted arguments are arguments (Is this referring more to the dialectic?) Although this belongs to the realm of “audience” Johnson makes a distinction between rhetoric (which focuses on effectiveness) and logic (looking for truth) and, Tindale claims, Johnson is putting more emphasis on rationality than effectiveness. In the defining of argument, one clear argument in the field is whether or not argument has to be rationale or persuasive (if anyone is reading this differently, please comment and let me know).

Another difference in defining/characterizing argumentation is looking at
what should lend itself to the study of argumentation. For instance, Tindale questions the distinction between formal and “casual” argumentation. Tindale questions Johnson’s claim that “an arguments is a type of discourse or text” (90) because such a distinction creates a top-down theory of argumentation where formal argumentation is more valued for analysis than “casual participants” (92). This seems to be at the root of O’Keefe’s argument as well; although I don’t remember him making the direct claim using Brockreide, his argument is clearly addressing the value of formal argument to information argument. Rowland addresses this distinction when discussing the debates between traditionalists “propositional discourse” based understanding of argument and theorists such as Willard who (and I’m paraphrasing here) sees defining argument limiting the social interactions that could/should be described as argument (81). This leads Rowland to assert that arguments are only arguments if they can be labeled as such.

Honestly there are so many dimensions to this/these arguments (I acknowledge the singular and plural because I think they could certainly be examined on a macro/micro level) that every time I go back to the text for clarification, I uncover more complexities.